華師經(jīng)英seminar第40期
【題目】Crowding in School Choice
【主講人】周愚副教授(日本京都大學(xué)，經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)研究科)
【主持人】周勻月博士
【時(shí)間】6月23日（周四）下午1:00
【地點(diǎn)】 騰訊會(huì)議794-844-594（會(huì)議密碼內(nèi)部通知，參會(huì)人員請(qǐng)輸入“實(shí)名+單位”進(jìn)入會(huì)場(chǎng)，會(huì)場(chǎng)謝絕一切廣告信息！）
【主講人簡(jiǎn)介】周愚，副教授（青年）日本京都大學(xué)經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)研究科，主要研究方向?yàn)槲⒂^經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)，博弈論以及市場(chǎng)設(shè)計(jì)。美國數(shù)學(xué)學(xué)會(huì)《數(shù)學(xué)評(píng)論》評(píng)論員，主要論文發(fā)表在在Games and Economic Behaviors，Inter national Economic Review以及經(jīng)濟(jì)研究等雜志上。目前完成并主持日本國家級(jí)課題3項(xiàng)（青年項(xiàng)目），作為子課題負(fù)責(zé)人承擔(dān)日本國家級(jí)重大課題3項(xiàng)。
【摘要】We consider the market design problem of matching students to schools in the presence of crowding effects. These effects are salient in parents' decision making and the empirical literature; however, they cause major difficulties in the design of satisfactory mechanisms and, as such, are not currently considered. We propose a new framework and an equilibrium notion that accommodates crowding, no-envy, and respect for priorities. The equilibrium has a student-optimal element that induces an incentive compatible mechanism and is implementable via a novel algorithm. Moreover, analogs of fundamental structural results of the matching literature---the Rural Hospitals Theorem, welfare lattice, etc.---survive.